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As Tunisia continues to push forward its democratic 
transition, rising energy bills are becoming a major ob-
stacle. The future of the country’s young democracy also 
depends on security and economic progress – and energy 
is a key factor in both. 
The energy challenges are clear.  Tunisia remains heav-
ily dependent in its consumption of primary energy on 
fossil fuels (84% for both oil and gas). In electricity pro-
duction alone, Tunisia heavily relies (97%) on natural gas, 
half of which it imports from neighboring Algeria. Given 
the currently grim economic conditions in the country 
coupled with high energy subsidies,1 the government 
finds itself increasingly burdened by high energy costs 
which cannot be sustained in the medium to long term. 
Despite a great potential of renewable energies, par-
ticularly wind and solar, the country relies on fossil-fuels 
in all its sectors and especially in the vital ones (power, 
transport and construction). In the past two decades, 
demand for energy has been consistently increasing, not 
least due to population growth. Meanwhile, domestic sup-
ply of crude oil has been steadily decreasing. In 2001, the 
country turned from an ‘energy net-exporting’ country 
into an ‘energy net-importing country’, raising the im-
portance of achieving energy independence as a national 
strategic objective over the years. 
Triggered by concerns that it was witnessing a sus-
tained decline in energy independence since the 1990s, 
Tunisia began an energy transition before the political 
revolution. In 2009 the government launched Le Plan So-
laire Tunisien or PST (Tunisian Solar Plan) as the corner-
stone of its energy transition strategy.2 The 2012 revision 
of the PST stipulates its general objective as increasing 
the share of renewables in the installed capacity for 
electricity generation from 2% to 30% until the year 2030 
(15% wind, 10% Solar Photovoltaic PV and 5% Concen-
trated Solar Power CSP). In addition to the promotion of 
renewable energies, the PST stipulates increasing energy 
efficiency to 34% in 2030. 
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In light of its energy independence concerns, the en-
ergy transition in Tunisia remains a largely indisputable 
national priority. Energy dynamics in Tunisia are part 
and parcel of the country’s larger ‘development-stability’ 
dilemma which has outlived the revolution it largely 
triggered. Similar to many countries in the wider MENA 
region, Tunisia is faced with the challenge of further 
advancing the political transition to democracy on the 
one hand and in parallel undergoing the transition to a 
sustainable energy pathway on the other. 
The parallel processes are not without conflict. There 
is an instinct to protect energy strategy from domestic 
political turmoil – to run the transition as a techno-
economic process. However, such a decoupling of energy 
from politics is neither easily achievable in the midst of 
a democratic transition, nor is it supportive of a demo-
cratic system. Thus, Tunisia will need to open its energy 
transformation to some participatory and inclusionary 
processes in order for it to be effective and efficient.  
Given the difficult political transition accompanied by 
social unrest and fragile security with the already-weak 
legal and regulatory framework, Tunisia is finding it diffi-
cult to attract adequate investments for its PST in the past 
years. The Tunisian private sector, which after decades 
of a state controlled economy remains largely weak and 
non-competitive, cannot be expected to play a big role in 
providing the necessary investment for the energy transi-
tion. The insufficient domestic investment has increased 
the need for Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) which are 
conditional to stable political conditions and reassuring 
legal frameworks for foreign investors. Efforts have been 
made to strengthen the legal framework for attracting in-
vestments. Most notably a new law was passed in August 
2016 (Law no. 2015-12) that establishes the legal frame-
work for integrating renewable energies in the grid and is 
meant to help attract the foreign investment necessary for 
such renewable integration. 
Energy efficiency efforts have had more success than 
the development of renewables. The country has been 
able to gradually and continually decrease its energy 
intensity levels. Thanks to a forward-looking policy of the 
energy sector by former president Habib Bourguiba (1956 
to 1987), an experimentalist attitude toward the adoption 
of different energy conservation mechanisms since the 
mid-1980s has left the country with a good regulatory 
framework that has supported significant advancements. 
According to a 2017 World Bank study, Tunisia is the only 
middle-income country in the region that ranks relatively 
high on several regulatory indicators pertaining to energy 
conservation and efficiency. For example, Tunisia is one 
of the leaders in the region in energy efficiency standards 
and labelling.3
The Tunisian Peculiarity 
Tunisia faces a particular challenge in advancing its 
political transition to democracy and in parallel undergo-
ing the shift to a sustainable energy pathway. While the 
two processes remain intrinsically linked, they present a 
compound challenge for decision makers. 
One approach to master this challenge is by decoupling 
the two processes in the hopes of avoiding exacerbating 
domestic instability amid widespread political unrest in 
the region. The decoupling approach attempts to insulate 
the energy transition process from political reforms, to 
ensure that the energy transition process remains outside 
the contestable political domain. With energy policy thus 
depoliticized, it becomes a techno-economic state-led af-
fair that favors centralized decision-making with limited 
room, if any, for participatory approaches.  
The decoupling of the two processes is perceived by 
most decision-makers across the region to be in line with 
the national interest because an effective top-down, cen-
tralized approach is thought to deliver on necessary na-
tional energy plans and be able to set targets more rapidly. 
While this wisdom prevails, in post-revolution Tunisia, 
the democratization process complicates the picture.
Dangers of Decoupling Energy Transition 
from Democratization 
In Tunisia, where the post-Arab Spring political transi-
tion is still laboring ahead, the decoupling strategy may 
very well have an adverse impact: trying to keep energy 
outside the democratic process could undermine both the 
political and the energy transition. There are two main 
reasons for this. 
First, in today’s Tunisia, public opinion matters. Some 
of the public mobilization initiatives that sprung up right 
after the overthrow of president Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, 
focus on energy-related issues. There are environmental 
movements against industrial pollution and environ-
mental degradation, particularly in the mining regions 
(such as those in the governorate of Gabes), as well as 
dissent initiatives or campaigns such as “Winou el petrol?” 
(“Where is the Oil?”). The reach of these campaigns 
indicates that public opinion and perceptions in post-
revolution Tunisia is a power to reckon with. The venues 
for freedom of expression have significantly widened 
since the 2010 revolution, creating new actors, new chan-
nels of contestation, and new levels of societal engage-
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ment. Consequently, energy sector reform has been and 
will continue to be more exposed to media scrutiny and 
public pressure. Furthermore, the legacy of dictatorship 
has eroded trust in the state so that technocratic, state-
led policies cannot count on public support, but instead 
will need to earn it.  If Tunisia’s democratic transition 
continues a pace, the energy transition will need to be 
supported by civil society multipliers. 
The second reason Tunisia cannot detangle energy 
from politics is that the energy transition (both in its 
objective and its process) is organically linked to the 
grievances that triggered the revolution in 2010. The 
long-standing vulnerabilities and inequalities, includ-
ing regional disparities and high unemployment rates, 
especially among youth, persist. There have been fre-
quent large-scale job protests demanding employment in 
the marginalized regions of the country.4 In general, the 
public is disenchanted with the post-revolution situation. 
This is especially true in the hinterland regions (such 
as the governorates of Jendouba, Le Kef, Kasserine and 
Gafsa) that lag behind in development due to decades of 
policies disadvantaging them under the old regime. Thus 
the central state and its energy projects face a distrustful 
public, and in some regions even an antagonistic one, and 
continuing socio-economic discontent.  
Democratizing Energy Transition as a Spill-
over Effect
The solar plan (PST) of 2009 and its review in 2012 pre-
date the 2014 Constitution, which may explain why there 
is a disconnect between the principles of the PST and the 
fundamental democratic principles laid out in the consti-
tution. Meanwhile, the challenges that led to an energy 
transition strategy in the first place have only grown.  The 
negative trends in the energy sector have been accompa-
nied by a worsening socio-economic situation, including 
high unemployment, which has averaged roughly 15% 
in the years since the revolution after having reached a 
record high of 19% in 2011. Therefore, a successful energy 
transition must also address the basic revolution demands 
such as increasing employment, fighting corruption, in-
creasing freedoms, and improving living conditions. 
The Tunisian Constitution, approved in 2014, is one 
of the greatest successes of post-revolution Tunisia.  To de-
liver upon the vision of the constitution, processes (partic-
ipatory and inclusionary) must become just as important 
as deliverables such as transparency, participatory de-
mocracy, and open governance. Indeed, the constitution’s 
preamble and several of its articles underscore values and 
principles directly linked to the energy transition, such as 
sustainable development and environmental protection.5 
At the same time, the document also emphasizes the 
centrality of the determination and will of the Tunisian 
People in the future of their country and distributional 
justice as a means of sharing national wealth. 
In contrast, the energy transition thus far has been 
a largely centralized process led mainly by a few cen-
tral state entities providing little space, if any, for local 
authorities and/or public participation. This bears few 
resemblances to the principles laid out in the 2014 Consti-
tution, such as free administration, participatory democ-
racy, and subsidiarity. 
The political transition has emphasized decentraliza-
tion as being conducive to democratization. The currently 
much discussed decentralization process against the 
background of the eagerly-anticipated adoption of the 
Code on Local Authorities,6 which ought to clearly describe 
the role of local councils in the overall political system, is 
a case in point. While the code has generated a lot of de-
bate and undergone several reviews, it has still not been 
ratified by the Tunisian parliament. If anything, these 
debates and delays only reconfirm the centrality of the 
role of local councils in the Tunisian democratic pathway 
and suggest that a highly centralized energy transition 
process may be simply incompatible with the aspirations 
of today’s Tunisians. 
Recommendations
Given the delicate political context in Tunisia, energy 
transition decisions need to take into account domestic 
political implications in two regards. The transition 
should have a strong socio-economic dimension, in 
order to not further exacerbate existing inequalities and 
economic weaknesses – and historically neglected interior 
regions deserve special attention. Second, future policy 
thinking and energy transition strategies should include 
some of the democratic values set out in the constitution 
and will, in any case, need to factor the public into the 
planning. A “citizens’ pillar” should be incorporated into 
the overall energy transition strategy. Below are a num-
ber of suggested measures for Tunisian decision makers 
and their development cooperation partners active in the 
energy sector: 
 . Underscoring employment in energy transition. Plans 
should strengthen and prioritize employment prospects 
in energy projects in the different regions. While Tuni-
sia’s energy challenges do not include issues of energy 
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access to the general population, the equitable sharing 
of national wealth remains of high priority, particu-
larly for the interior regions that feel abandoned by the 
central state. Therefore, the energy transition should 
aim to boost employment policy in these regions. For 
this purpose, a differentiated needs-based approach 
by region is essential, and it must go beyond the PST’s 
approach that focuses on regions’ potential or technical 
suitability for specific renewable energy-based projects, 
but ignores socio-political considerations. 
 . Enhancing the role of local authorities in the energy 
transition. Decision makers should seize the momen-
tum of the current debate on decentralization to tailor a 
more significant role for the local councils in advancing 
the energy transition on their level. This will not only 
increase their sense of ownership of the energy transi-
tion but could prove decisive for the success of projects 
in the regions where they are planned. Local councils 
should also be encouraged to advance their own local 
renewable energy initiatives as effect-multipliers of 
the energy transition. For this purpose, policy makers 
should prioritize capacity building for the promotion of 
structured energy and environment awareness cam-
paigns, tailored to the specific needs of local councils 
across all regions. 
 . Conducting energy-relevant surveys and opinion polls. 
Independent and transparent surveys and opinion polls 
on the most contentious issues should be carried out 
regularly. The selection of the issues should be based on 
public demand and media attention as well as relevance 
to energy projects planned or existing, including envi-
ronment and public health issues. For example, public 
perceptions of environmental degradation ought to be 
regarded as a matter of high importance in all regions. 
According to a recent survey co-conducted by Heinrich-
Boell-Stiftung in Tunis in 2016,7 the majority of Tuni-
sians are acutely aware of environmental well-being. 
While environmental impact assessment studies are 
required by law as prerequisites for permits to energy 
projects (since law no. 2005-106), such legal require-
ments are not substitutes for understanding public 
perceptions and adequately addressing them. Polls help 
fill this gap by not only providing decision-makers with 
insight into public opinion but also opening channels 
for citizens to express popular concerns and demands. 
Shahrazad Far is a researcher and project manager at 
the Bonn-based Think Tank Bonn International Center for 
Conversion (BICC) focusing on energy transition and de-
carbonization politics.
Notes
 1  Efforts have been made with the aim of decreas-
ing energy subsidies and eventually phasing them 
out. 
 2  Despite its name PST does not only concern solar 
renewable energy technologies but also wind. The 
PST was preceded by several laws paving the way 
for it, most notably law no. 2004-72 for energy ef-
ficiency; and law no. 2005-106 establishing a fund 
for the energy transition. 
 3  According to the Scorecard Regulatory Indicators 
for Sustainable Energy RISE, Tunisia ranks at the 
19th place out of 111 countries covered. The rank-
ing is for the total score for the energy efficiency 
pillar which includes 12 regulatory indicators. 
Ghosh Banerjee et.al, Rise 2016, International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World 
Bank, 2017 “Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable 
Energy: A Global Scorecard for Policy Makers”. 
See: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/538181487106403375/pdf/112828-REVISED-
PUBLIC-RISE-2016-Report.pdf> (accessed July 
27, 2017).
 4  Job protests have increased in the last year. In 
May, they halted oil and gas production of two 
foreign companies operating in Tunisia. See:  
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-
protests-idUSKBN1841WQ> (accessed July 27, 
2017).  
 5  Including but not limited to arts. 10, 12, 13 and 
136.
6  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-
election/tunisia-to-hold-long-delayed-municipal-
vote-in-2018-idUSKBN1ED1DI (accessed Decem-
ber 22, 2017).  
 7  Heinrich Boell Stiftung, Survey of Opinion on the 
Environmental Situation in Tunisia, December 
2016. See: <https://tn.boell.org/fr/2017/04/04/
sondage-dopinion-sur-la-situation-envi-
ronnementale-en-tunisie> (accessed July 27, 
2017). 
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